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Abstract 
 
Autonomous mechanisms have been proposed to regulate certain aspects of society and are 
already being used to regulate business organisations. We take seriously recent proposals for 
algorithmic regulation of society, and we identify the existing technologies that can be used to 
implement them, most of them originally introduced in business contexts. We build on the 
notion of ‘social machine’ and we connect it to various ongoing trends and ideas, including 
crowdsourced task-work, social compiler, mechanism design, reputation management systems, 
and social scoring. After showing how all the building blocks of algorithmic regulation are 
already well in place, we discuss possible implications for human autonomy and social order. 
The main contribution of this paper is to identify convergent social and technical trends that 
are leading towards social regulation by algorithms, and to discuss the possible social, political, 
and ethical consequences of taking this path.  
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1 - Introduction 
 
A recent article by historian Yuval Harari argues that “the conflict between democracy and 
dictatorship” is not one “between different ethical systems, but actually between data-
processing systems.” (Harari, 2018). While in the 20th century liberal democracies benefited 
from their decentralised approach to decision-making – distributing information and power 
among many people proved to be more effective than concentrating them in one place – in the 
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21st century recent progress in Artificial Intelligence (AI) has turned this around by enabling 
intelligent systems to process large volumes of information centrally (Harari, 2018). According 
to Harari, this shift would suggest that democratic ideals, such as equality and liberty, are “more 
fragile than we believe” (Harari 2018). Thus, rather than being “self-evident” or “irreversible” 
(Harari 2018), these ideals may change subtly, in a way that we do not expect, and we do not 
want. 
 
This article is concerned with the notion of “social regulation”, by which we mean the activity 
of governing a society, encouraging certain outcomes over others, steering the behaviour of a 
community. While this activity has traditionally been performed by a complex of explicit and 
implicit rules, enacted by an authority, or elicited by social interactions, we are interested in 
how modern AI technology interacts with it.  
 
The problem of effectively governing a country of hundreds of millions of citizens has been 
debated in policy circles for a long time (Heaven, 2017), and there are proposals to turn to 
digital technology (Larson, 2018). In this article, we will use the expression “algorithmic 
regulation” to refer to the use of algorithmic methods for social regulation or governance1.  
 
As we debate new ways to apply intelligent technologies to governance, we cannot ignore that 
modern web companies manage numbers of users larger than that of most countries (Constine, 
2017), nor can we ignore the problems posed by the deployment of AI in restricted domains 
such as personalised news delivery and enforcement decisions (e.g. Mittelstadt, 2016; Burr et 
al, 2018, Scantamburlo et al, 2019). What could be the effect of deploying AI systems at the 
centre of a growing infrastructure of linked-data for governance of a whole society? To answer 
this question, we take seriously the proposal made by Tim O’Reilly for algorithmic regulation 
of society, examine its risks, and its relation to experiments currently under way in different 
countries and the private sector.  
 
In 2013, the Silicon Valley investor, publisher, and futurist Tim O’Reilly proposed that society 
can be more effectively regulated by using feedback loops, rather than top-down law 
enforcement. His example was the way in which ride-sharing apps (e.g. Uber) can regulate the 
                                                             
1 Other definitions have been proposed by Yeung (2017) and Hildebrandt (2018). Our discussion 
connects also to Gillespie (2017) but it extends beyond the problem of how social media platforms 
curate contents and police the activity of their users by algorithms.  
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behaviour of both drivers and passengers, both by leveraging a range of sensor data and by 
maintaining a reputation management system, instead of using top-down rules and inspection 
(O’Reilly, 2013). O’Reilly also drew general conclusions for social governance, suggesting 
that data sources, combined with a reputation management system can do a better job than any 
amount of government regulation (O’Reilly, 2013:293). Taxis can “increase their availability 
even in less frequented locations” and, more importantly, by asking passengers to rate their 
drivers, the quality of services can improve automatically: “drivers who provide poor service 
are eliminated” (O’Reilly, 2013, 293). The central elements indicated by O’Reilly for his 
notion of algorithmic regulation are: clear outcomes, real-time measurements indicating 
whether those outcomes have been achieved, and adjustments of the rules based on such 
measurements (O’Reilly, 2013, 290). Of course, these are also the central requirements of 
feedback-control systems in engineering, as will be discussed below.  
 
Similar proposals have recently gained importance, since the government of China announced 
the creation of a national scoring system for its citizens that can ultimately be used to administer 
positive and negative incentives, either in the form of these citizens being added to or removed 
from certain lists, and in some cases in the form of points assigned to citizens based on their 
behaviour (Creemers, 2018). Bad behaviours (also called “trust-breaking acts”), such as tax 
evasion or refusal to carry out statutory duties, contribute new entrants in a blacklist and this 
affects both individuals and organisations by imposing penalties and limiting access to 
government programmes, high-speed trains, hotels or purchases, etc.2  
 
While governments and public organisations are moving forward, the private sector went ahead 
with the employment of pervasive tracking and scoring mechanisms for the enforcement of 
desired behaviours. In this way, eBay allows buyers and sellers to rate one another to ensure 
successful trading, health insurance companies3 use trackers and personalised incentives to 
                                                             
2 As well as Creemers (2018) see also the following document: “State Council Guiding Opinions 
concerning Establishing and Perfecting Incentives for Promise-keeping and Joint Punishment Systems 
for Trust-Breaking, and Accelerating the Construction of Social Sincerity.” State Council. 30th May 
2016. Available online: https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2016/05/30/state-council-
guiding-opinions-concerning-establishing-and-perfecting-incentives-for-promise-keeping-and-joint-
punishment-systems-for-trust-breaking-and-accelerating-the-construction-of-social-sincer/.  
3 For example, Vitality programme (https://www.vitalitygroup.com/) provides customers with a 
smartphone app to set up personalised goals, carry out and monitor activities (e.g. buying healthy 
food, doing physical exercise, spinning wheel, etc). The application includes the use of personal data, 
gamified elements and scoring mechanism (Sullivan, 2018). 
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help their customers “live longer” (Sullivan, 2018), and many apps for housekeeping activities, 
like Handy, work in a Uber-style fashion to offer efficient and affordable services (Ticona et 
al., 2018). Likewise, Amazon fulfilment centres constantly monitor and analyse their 
employees to meet certain performance standards (Bernton and Kelleher, 2012) and, as we 
recently discovered, Facebook scores its users’ trustworthiness when they flag a post as fake 
(Dwoskin, 2018).  
 
China’s social credit score represents a paradigmatic example, but parts of the anatomy of the 
Chinese system – individual ID, linked data, automated interventions – (Creemers, 2018) are 
in place, or under way, also in other countries such as Singapore and Estonia. In most of these 
attempts there are plans to integrate services which may involve citizens, associations or 
business activities, from voting to education, taxes and justice, in one single infrastructure that 
can run processes by itself (filing taxes, reviewing medical records, checking eligibility for 
voting, etc.) and influence collective behaviour4 
 
To analyse the main technical and sociological underpinnings of O’Reilly’s proposal we will 
review the various components that would be needed to implement that type of algorithmic 
regulation of a society, and how these components are being used at the moment. In doing so, 
we encounter the notions of reputation management, social machines, and autonomous agents, 
among others, and we propose a unified framework that can help us understand how close we 
already are to O’Reilly’s vision of a society regulated by algorithms, and what might be some 
of its consequences. 
 
In this article, motivated by O’Reilly’s intuition, we relate the notion of algorithmic regulation 
to the use of digital systems to monitor citizens and give them automatic and personalised 
incentives with the purpose of influencing their behaviour. The question we want to pose 
concerns the implications of using algorithmic regulation technologies to govern a society.  
 
To summarise our main findings: social machines are a stable technology that is used, among 
other things, to create reputation management systems; the principles and details of their design 
                                                             
4 For example, albeit different, both China’ Social Credit Score and Estonia’ e-government aim at 
promoting certain behaviours within society. So, the Chinese ambition is to stimulate sincerity and 
trust (Creemers, 2018), while the Estonia’s goal is to foster transparency and “to make it impossible to 
do bad things” (Keen, 2016)   
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are extremely important for considerations relative to user autonomy (mechanism design and 
crowdsourcing being parts of the discussion); once created, these machines can act as 
autonomous agents, and act in a way to maximise their utility (whose alignment with collective 
utility should not be taken for granted) generating important technical and social challenges 
relative to their stability, alignment, transparency and fairness. Feedback loops and control are 
other key features of such systems and may interfere with fundamental aspects of our society 
such as people’s autonomy, social order and the exercise of power. 
 
This article is organised as follows. In section 2 we will describe the notion of social machines, 
how they can be implemented and how they can be used to implement autonomous agents. In 
section 3 we will describe reputation (management) systems, how they relate to social scoring 
and how they can be part of a regulatory feedback loop. In section 4 we will put these two ideas 
together to describe how we already have social regulation via distributed reputation scoring, 
all mediated by a single algorithm, in limited domains. As these methods are currently used in 
the private sector, we briefly look at what can be learnt from that experience, before discussing 
current efforts to deploy them to regulate entire societies. In section 5 we will discuss some 
considerations about the technical and social consequences of this proposed turn and 
summarise our findings in the conclusions.  
 
 
2 - Social Machines as Autonomous Systems  
 
The essence of algorithmic regulation proposals lies in the automatic delivery of positive and 
negative incentives (e.g., discounts or fines) to individuals for specific actions, behaviours or 
performance. These incentives are aimed at individuals, and therefore require ways to collect 
individual information, resulting either from measurements (e.g., time required to perform a 
delivery) or from social feedback (e.g., customer satisfaction rating, as proposed in O’Reilly, 
2013). 
 
In this sense, their implementation would not be very different than for existing forms of 
personalisation (e.g., personalised recommendations or ads, or credit scores), and would 
typically require a way to identify individuals, and gather and store individual information, 
including some sort of a score. The citizens would be expected to adjust their behaviour in a 
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way to improve their score, if it is linked to benefits, opportunities, or even just social 
recognition.  
 
While some of the required individual information would be directly observed and measured 
(e.g. geolocation data, payments, etc.), a part of it would be the product of human judgment (as 
in the car-sharing example). In order to understand the functioning of this class of systems 
(e.g., reputation systems) that bring together algorithms and humans we will employ the more 
general notion of social machines.  
 
2.1 – Social Machines  
  
A machine is a system, or apparatus, formed by several parts, each with a definite function, 
which interact together in a specific way, so as to perform a particular task. There is no 
limitation to the technical substrate of these parts, e.g., they can include hydraulic, electric, or 
mechanical parts, among others. A social machine is a special type of machine where some of 
the components, performing some subtask, are formed by humans (whom we call participants).   
 
The moving assembly line is an example of a social machine. An assembly line is formed by a 
set of workstations where the same operations are always performed in a consistent way, and 
various parts are added to a product, as it moves through the line. Some of the operations are 
performed by machines, and others by people, in a highly coordinated and systematic fashion. 
So long as all the operations are performed in the same time and way, it does not matter who 
performs them. Human participants are typically used for operations that cannot be easily 
automated, but act in very structured manner, and do not control the overall process. They are 
in fact parts of a machine and do not need to be aware of the overall results of their actions in 
order to do their job.  
 
A bureaucracy is another, classic form of social machine5. For example, take a national post 
office, a bank or an airline, they all share a set of structural characteristics: e.g. functions and 
                                                             
5 Max Weber (1978) was the first to acknowledge this and considered bureaucracy as the most 
effective form of organisation: “The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has 
always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed 
bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-
mechanical modes of production.” (Weber, 1978, 973) 
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roles reflect a hierarchy, tasks are divided among workers and performed routinely, the input 
and the output of the tasks are standardised, the workflow and the coordination among the 
workers are specified by rules and communications are performed via structured forms. Even 
though many tasks are performed by humans, each participant has limited autonomy and is not 
in the position to determine the behaviour of the overall machine, maybe not even be aware of 
it.  
 
Drawing on a rich literature (e.g. see Berners-Lee and Fischetti, 1999; Smart and Shadbolt, 
2014) we define a social machine as a machine where human participants and technical 
artefacts (e.g. a car, a piece of software, a robot) interact with one another to perform a task 
that would be hardly achievable by any single part6. Mechanisms incorporating ‘participants’ 
extend across domains and include: assembly lines, bureaucracies, auctions, markets, voting 
schemes, product delivery services, games, peer production, crowdsourcing, etc.   
 
Even though social machines have existed for a long time, they have been formalised only 
recently in the context of web technologies (Berners-Lee and Fischetti, 1999) and include 
various ways in which communities are organised by a web-based infrastructure7. Online 
crowdsourcing services, such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, operate as modern assembly 
lines, where each participant performs a well specified task, that might be difficult to automate, 
and does not need to know the overall goals of the machine. For example, participants can be 
asked to tag faces in photos by gender, to annotate images or articles, to type handwritten 
words, to answer questions and so forth.  
 
Participants in crowdsourcing not only might not know the purpose of the machine, they might 
not even know its boundaries, i.e. what else is part of it. In other words, they are not in the 
position to control the machine’s overall behaviour. The use of web infrastructures to 
coordinate the behaviour of participants has proven to be a very effective way to organise social 
machines that may reach sizes of millions of participants.  
 
                                                             
6 Note that the meaning of “social machine” overlaps many popular abstractions such as “collective 
intelligence”, “distributed cognition”, “wisdom of crowd”, “social computing”, “social computation.” 
7 Note that when referred to web infrastructures, the notion of social machine incorporates that of 
online platform developed in media studies: “an online platform should be understood as a 
programmable digital architecture designed to organize interactions between users—not just end users 
but also corporate entities and public bodies.” (Van Dijck et al. 2018) 
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A distinct example of web-based social machine is Wikipedia, where participants do not 
execute instructions, but are regulated by tight rules8, and interact via a common software 
infrastructure to generate and maintain an encyclopaedia. News curation communities such as 
Reddit and Digg work in similar ways, centred around shared social practices and software 
infrastructures.  
 
Yet a different example of social machines is given by the cases where humans do not need to 
be aware, they are participating. YouTube users generate high quality information about videos 
simply as a by-product of using the service (Covington et al., 2016). Similarly, eBay users 
participate in a very advanced mechanism to establish the price of goods, just by bidding for 
products.  
 
The examples above show that there can be two fundamentally different ways to design a social 
machine, and we will call them ‘design principles.’ 
 
In one case, participants are directly instructed to perform tasks chosen by others and rewarded 
for that. This covers the assembly line, the bureaucracy, and in the case of online social 
machines, might cover cases like employment of Mechanical Turk workers to join a more 
complex machine.  
 
The other case is where humans choose to participate in an activity, e.g. editing Wikipedia, 
ranking items, watching a video, and, as the unintended result of their acts, the machine as a 
whole performs a task. Note that, in this case, the participants might not need to be willing or 
aware to be part of a mechanism. For example, von Ahn and Dabbish, (2004) found that in 1 
month 5,000 people can provide high-quality annotation for more than 400,000,000 images 
just by playing a carefully designed sort of guessing game, called the ‘ESP game’9. In general, 
                                                             
8 There are specific guidelines, e.g., for creating content (e.g. editors should write in a neutral way, 
avoiding, understatement/overstatement, and self-published sources, etc), for reviewing articles (e.g. 
good article should meet certain standards, such as verifiability and broad coverage), or for solving 
disputes (e.g. editors can create a ‘talk page’ to discuss changes or controversial contents and request a 
third-party opinion where necessary). For a full list see : 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:List_of_policies_and_guidelines#Content_policies  
9 The ESP game consists of two players who are remotely looking at the same image and are rewarded 
for guessing which words the other use to describe it. Since they are randomly paired and unable to 
contact each other, it becomes a mind-reading game, hence it was called ESP (Extra Sensory Perception) 
game (von Ahn and Dabbish, 2004). The optimal strategy for each player was to enter the label that is 
most appropriate for the label within a certain amount of time. In a four-month experiment, van Ahn 
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the same mechanism is at work in gamified crowdsourcing apps, like FoldIt10, where people 
perform some complex or costly tasks without realizing they are doing so.  
 
In the first class, social machines are designed according to a top-down approach. Participants 
receive instructions specified by a designer and execute them. In the second class, social 
machines are designed according to a bottom-up approach. Participants voluntarily pursue their 
personal goals, but their individual actions and interactions are constrained in such a way that 
the resulting (i.e. emergent) collective behaviour turns out to be pursuing the goals of the 
overall machine. Ant colonies complete complex tasks without any of the ants being aware of 
that or being in control. Markets, auctions, online recommender and e-commerce systems, 
might be in a similar league.  
 
In the top-down approach, the instructions might be specified in a high-level programme11 and 
dispatched to the operating components possibly by means of a social compiler12, a layer of the 
machinery that would break the programme into elementary operations and assign them to the 
parts (i.e. human participants and machines).  
 
In the bottom-up approach, the system is best described in terms of mechanism design, i.e. as 
an emergent behaviour resulting from the interaction of multiple rational agents. When this 
happens, both participants and the whole machine are specified in terms of the goals they purse 
rather than the instructions they need to follow. Technically speaking, they behave like 
autonomous agents.  
 
2.2 – Autonomous Social Machines  
                                                             
and Dabbish (2004) suggested that the ESP game could be used to tag all Google Images. In 2006 
Google got the license to develop its own version of the game (Google Image Labeller). 
10 FoldIt (https://fold.it/portal/) is an online puzzle video game launched in 2008 by the University of 
Washington. By playing the game thousand users helped researchers to discover some protein 
configurations.  
11 Programming languages to specify and coordinate crowdsourcing workers already exist. An example 
is AutoMan, a “crowd-programming system” based on Scala which allows the programmer to manage 
some parameters (scheduling, budgeting and quality control) and to abstract the details of the tasks “so 
that human computation can be as easy to invoke as a conventional function” (Barowy et al. 2012, 641) 
12 A proposal to build “crowdsourcing compiler” has been put forward by Chen et. al. (2016). The 
crowdsource compiler would decide “which components of the task are best carried out by machine 
and which by human volunteers; whether the human volunteers should be incentivized by payment, 
recognition, or entertainment; how their contributions should be combined to solve the overall task; and 
so on.” (Chen et al., 2016, 106) 
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A system is said to be autonomous when it acts under its own control, i.e. it is driven by some 
intrinsic goals13. Autonomous agents are called “goal-driven” or “rational” when they pursue 
goals, specified by a utility function that they try to maximise14. 
 
Autonomous agents can use information gathered from the environment to make their own 
decisions and control some aspect of their environment. They can be adaptive (capable of 
learning) and perform types of inference (capable of reasoning). We often use the language of 
belief, preferences and utility to describe them, but this is for convenience and not necessity 
(e.g. see Russell and Norvig, 2010 and Burr et al., 2018).  
 
Biological organisms or even species can be described as autonomous goal-driven systems 
(maximising number of offspring), as well as engineered control-systems (e.g. a thermostat 
pursuing homeostasis), but also economic agents (e.g. maximising profit). But not all systems 
can be described in this way. For example, typical assembly lines would not be an autonomous 
system, as they would not be able to react to changes in the environment without new 
instructions coming from outside. Wikipedia might be a kind of hybrid case since, while editors 
are driven by some private interests, their individual and collective behaviour is influenced by 
a series of guidelines and norms which are continuously revised and debated by the participants 
of the community (i.e. they are not elicited by the system’s utility function). 
 
Social machines can be used to implement autonomous goal-driven agents, even if human 
participants are not aware of that. In this case, the participants should not be able to determine 
the behaviour of the whole system – otherwise the system would not be autonomous. We call 
them Autonomous Social Machines (hereafter, ASMs). 
 
Examples of ASMs can readily be found over the Internet. They include the recommendation 
systems behind YouTube or Amazon, which could never perform their function if it was not 
                                                             
13 Since autonomous agents are directed towards the attainment of some purpose (“telos” in ancient 
Greek), their behaviour might be called “teleological” and has been widely studied in Cybernetics 
(Wiener, 1948) and Artificial Intelligence (Russell and Norvig, 2010). 
14 In economics, the notion of ‘utility’ is a metrics representing a user’s satisfaction derived from 
picking one among possible options (e.g. in a recommender system, options might be books or 
videos). We represent a user’s ordering preferences over a set of alternatives by using a utility 
function.  
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for the structured activity of their users - which act as (unaware) participants while make use 
of the system for their own purposes. Indeed, those systems were created when certain products 
or users did not exist, yet they can autonomously process them appropriately, as they learn and 
generalise. Common users’ actions (purchasing, filling a wish list, reviewing or searching 
items, rating a transaction, flagging a comment, etc.) translate into information and ultimately 
into recommendations (Ricci et al., 2011). 
 
The behaviour of an ASM is not dictated externally by any of its participants, nor is it pre-
determined by its original designers: it is instead the emergent result of its interactions. So long 
as the human participants perform local tasks without controlling the system, the resulting 
social machine can be considered autonomous. While the goal of most recommender and 
marketplace systems is to increase either click-through rates or sales or profits (generally called 
interactions, or engagements, see Burr et al. 2018), none of the human participants has the same 
goals.  
 
In the design of autonomous social machines, a crucial problem is to link effectively 
participant’s utility with that of the whole system in a way that the pursuit of the former 
maximizes the latter. To solicit the desired behaviour from participants, the designer might 
need to devise a series of incentives which may be positive (monetary rewards, points, forms 
of social recognition, etc) or negative (fines, exclusion from participation, etc.). In so doing the 
designer will develop specific mechanisms which will try to influence participants’ behaviour 
so as to make them act in a way that maximises the utility of the whole system.15  
 
The study and the implementation of incentive schemes constitutes the main subject of 
mechanism design, a branch of game theory with broad applications in markets, auctions, 
voting procedures, etc. (e.g. see Börgers, 2015). Note that mechanism design is perfectly suited 
to O’Reilly request for clear outcomes – “the secret”, he says, “is to identify key outcomes that 
we care about as a society” (O’Reilly, 2016, 293) – since it works backwards, i.e. it sets up 
goals before choosing the rules of the game. In this way, it is possible to solve “a centralized 
problem in an informationally decentralized system” (Naghizadeh and Liu, 2016).  
 
                                                             
15 Note that similar mechanisms have been widely studied in nudging theories, where a typical 
problem is how to influence agents’ behaviour by intervening on the presentation of available options 
(Thaler & Sustain, 2008). For a discussion of nudging in the context of AI see (Burr et al., 2018) 
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While (automated) incentive mechanisms are not necessary for the regulation of a social 
machine – e.g. assembly line workers compliance with the rules can well be enforced via 
traditional systems – their employment can make a difference in the development of 
algorithmic regulation. Not only they may create those conditions which promote compliance 
and facilitate implementation, as pointed out by O’Reilly, but can also shift the locus of power 
and control of the system to the locus of the reward function, as well as giving rise to issues 
that will be discussed later (see section n. 5), such as value alignment. But before exploring 
potential problems, we examine how an ASM can make adjustments based on the information 
produced by the participants and activate mechanisms of feedback-loop. 
 
 
3 – Reputation System and Credit Scoring 
 
The systems being proposed by O’Reilly to replace current governance methods are based on 
the (control-theoretic) notion of a feedback loop, so that individual actions or behaviours 
directly result into personal incentives. This is implemented by the intermediation of an 
infrastructure that keeps track of each participant, information relative to them, and their score 
(similar infrastructures are commonplace in the domains of Customer Relationship 
Management and Human Resources Management Systems). 
 
The fundamental technology required for this kind of social regulation is akin to that of a 
Reputation System, a social machine evolved in online communities to process trust, combined 
with a more modern version of credit scores. It is also related to Performance Management 
Systems such as those used in warehouses of online shops, such as Amazon. If combined 
together, these quantities can form a score which functions as an incentive-system to foster a 
desired behaviour (e.g. trustworthiness or productiveness).   
 
Reputation Systems arose in the context of web communities for promoting trust and good 
conduct among the group’s members (Jøsang at al., 2005). They allowed users to rate each 
other after completing a transaction and aggregate these ratings to produce a reputation score 
(Jøsang at al., 2005). This enables a notion of trust in online environments where users have 
limited information about products and other users. Note that rating can work in slightly 
different ways: while quality ratings allow users to assess things like movies and restaurants, 
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reputation rating allow members of a community to rate each other. For example, in 
TripAdvisor users rate hotels and restaurants, in IMDB they rate movies, in Yelp they review 
local businesses, etc. In eBay, Uber and AirBnB, however, users rate each other and, in so 
doing, they provide information about members’ trustworthiness. In so doing, reputation 
systems offer an implementation of those social fictions that Harari describes as essential for 
the functioning of a large society (Harari, 2014) 
 
Note that rating mechanisms can be included also in recommender systems16. However, the 
scoring mechanism plays a different role in recommendation and reputation. While in the 
former case the score is used to estimate the preferences of users, in the latter case it is used to 
enforce some standard, i.e. avoid bad service providers17 and, for this reason, is said to function 
as a form of “collaborative sanctioning” (Jøsang at al., 2005), a feature well encapsulated in 
O’Reilly’s proposal. In other words, if we consider transactions occurring between a supplier 
and a consumer, the same mechanism can be deployed either for the purpose of enabling 
consumers to make a more rational choice, or for encouraging suppliers to adopt a given 
behaviour. 
 
Moreover, reputation systems can incorporate various mechanisms to avoid malicious attacks 
from unauthorised users, but also spamming, bias and distortion. Indeed, a reputation system 
may face the problem of participants looking for shortcuts or tricks which maximise their utility 
but do not align with the utility of the system. For example, a user may want to inflate others’ 
perception about itself (e.g. to increase visibility) or not to report truthful information about 
others (Naghizahiadeh and Liu, 2013), or an Uber driver might want to refuse a short ride, in 
the name of his/her convenience but against the interest of the passengers. We might say that 
these systems have by now become one of the various immune systems for large online 
communities. 
 
                                                             
16 Recommender systems that incorporate rating mechanisms could be based on collaborative filtering, 
a technique that make predictions of user’s preferences based on similarity measures among users. 
17 In comparing Collaborative filtering systems with Reputation systems, Jøsang et al. (2005) observed 
that while collaborative filtering selects rating based on similarities among users (the premise is that 
users with similar tastes will prefer similar products), a reputation system assumes that all members 
should judge the quality of a service or product because the aim is “to sanction poor service” (Jøsang 
at al. 2005: 624). This connects to another important distinction: collaborative filtering assumes that all 
members are trustworthy whereas reputation systems suppose that some users will try to deceive for 
increasing their personal benefits (Jøsang at al. 2005: 625). 
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While reputation systems produce a score that reflects the subjective judgments of a group of 
individuals about another individual, product or businesses, other social machines can output 
a score that results from objective measurements of participants’ actions. This may involve 
monitoring activities by means of sensors, cameras, smartphones, or more sophisticated tools18, 
and generate a score that may capture relevant information about worker’s performance, such 
as productivity or engagement19.  
 
In general, scoring systems could be derived from combining various signals: reputation, 
objective performance criteria and other attributes (e.g. demographics). In some cases, a social 
machine can combine multiple sources, such as reputation and performance metrics. For 
example, several on-demand apps, like Uber, Lyft or TaskRabbit employ both social feedbacks 
and work performance metrics, such as acceptance/cancellation rates and the number of tasks 
carried out, and both can contribute to derive penalties and rewards.20 
 
In many countries a well-known example of scoring mechanism is a credit score. This is a 
number intended to represent the risk of lending money to a particular individual. Credit scores 
were first introduced by FICO decades ago in United States, but from 1989 there has been a 
general-purpose FICO score is used by credit card companies and banks, and other companies 
exist that provide similar services (we discuss how credit scoring regulate consumers’ 
behaviour in section 4.3). Scores are based on data coming from consumer-credit files provided 
by “credit bureaus”, which may include: payment history (35%, how fast you pay your bills, 
                                                             
18 Think of Amazon’s wristband which uses ultrasonic tracking and a haptic feedback system for 
controlling the worker’s hands. The wristband vibrates against the worker’s skin if the hand points to 
the wrong direction (Solon, 2018) 
19 The field dealing with the tracking of employee’s behaviour to extract information about their 
performance is also called “people analytics”. This include workplace technologies that analyse 
various signals such as emails’ content, web-browsing patterns, list of apps opened and generate some 
score. For example, WorkSmart is a platform owned by Crossover 
(https://www.crossover.com/worksmart/#worksmart-productivity-tool) that takes photos of employees 
every 10 minutes, combines them with screenshots of their workstation and other data, and comes up 
with an “intensity score” (Solon, 2017). 
20 Penalties may include a temporary deactivation of worker’s profile and fees, e.g. see Ticona et al. 
(2018). In Handy, for example the service professional agreement states that: “In the event a Service 
Professional's aggregate rating falls below the applicable minimum rating, Handy reserves the right to 
deactivate the Service Professional's access to the Handy Platform.” 
(https://www.handy.com/pro_terms)  
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bankruptcies); amounts owed, credit utilisation (30%, how much you have borrowed out of 
your total allowance); length of credit history (15%), etc. 21  
 
The effects of scoring systems, such as credit score and reputation systems, depend on the way 
they are used. If they determine how easy it is for users to receive a service (such as a loan, or 
a car ride), then any change in these scores directly affects the expected utility of users and so 
their existence is likely to influence user behaviour. In the sociological literature the same effect 
is called “reactivity”: social measures, such as risk score or performance indicators, are called 
“reactive” because they “elicit responses from people who intervene in the objects they 
measure” (Espeland and Sauder, 2007, 2). For example, schools and universities have made 
relevant changes in reaction to being ranked. So, they have changed the way in which they 
select students, allocate resources and organise work in order to optimize their rank 
(Espeland and Sauder, 2007). 
 
Likewise, the design of reputation mechanisms has direct consequences for the people being 
scored. For example, an Uber driver with a bad or poor reputation might be suspended from 
work and, as a consequence of this, be encouraged to improve his or her service. Reputation 
score has a clear impact also in eBay: the average sales price of the same item can increase by 
3% for top-rated sellers (Xiang Hui et al., 2016)  
 
The basic idea of using scoring mechanisms in algorithmic regulation is precisely to exploit 
reactivity to steer collective behaviour by using scores as incentives. This is where control 
theory meets social scoring. 
 
4 - Social Control and Feedback Loop: ASMs for Algorithmic Regulation  
 
So far, we have seen that there exist mechanisms that can monitor the behaviour of an 
individual and compute a score that captures how aligned that behaviour is with a given value 
function. That score can increase and decrease in response to behaviour or performance, just 
like a credit score does, and it can include elements that are typical of reputation systems. 
Generally, these mechanisms can be based on social machines like those described above and 
                                                             
21 FICO, also known as Fair Isaac Corporation, is an analytics software company based in California 
which was founded by William Fair and Earl Isaac in 1956. On FICO score and its components see 
also http://www.fico.com/25years/  
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be autonomous (i.e. an ASM), in the sense that various participants can provide the signals that 
inform that score – either directly or indirectly – but no individual can significantly affect or 
control the system’s outcome. 
 
ASMs which embed scoring mechanisms offer a natural setting for O’Reilly’s proposal since 
they have a clear outcome, real-time measurements and mechanisms of adjustment (O’Reilly, 
2013, 290), i.e. all the elements listed as necessary for a feedback-control system. In practice, 
they are capable of observing the state or actions of an individual, computing how it aligns with 
their goals, and then administering positive or negative incentives. So, their behaviour can be 
studied from the perspective of Control Theory.  
 
4.1 – Regulation by control systems  
 
A control system (the “controller”) regulates the behaviour of another system (the “plant”, or 
“controlled system”) by taking actions that 1) depend on the current state of the controlled 
system and 2) affect it. To do this, the controller needs to a) observe the state of the controlled 
system, b) compare it with the target state (the “set-point”), and c) act on the controlled system 
to change its state. So, a controller must include sensors, actuators and a control algorithm. 
Clear goals (target state) and clear sensing (current state) are necessary, and the difference 
between these two states is used as a control signal22.  
 
O’Reilly’s idea, of presenting citizens with incentives (rewards or punishments) that directly 
follow from their actions, aims at establishing a control loop - where citizens are assumed to 
act rationally, and therefore adapt their behaviour to maximise their utility. Actuators in this 
case are replaced by the capability to act on the score of an individual, i.e. to administer 
incentives. An important requirement, of course, is that the controller has clear targets, can 
predict (probabilistically) the consequences of its actions and can read the actual state of the 
controlled system.  
 
In general, the behaviour of individuals can be influenced in various ways. There are forms of 
‘soft’ control that increase the probability of an action being taken. Common methods may 
                                                             
22 When the controller’s action depends on such a difference (e.g. the house temperature and the 
temperature set on the thermostat) the process is said to be a “closed loop control system”. 
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include nudging based on cognitive biases, or trading based on knowledge of economic 
incentives, and even extend to forms of coercion or deception (Burr et al. 2018). A mechanism 
of this type, when applied to entire societies, can potentially steer their collective behaviour 
and offer alternative methods to law enforcement.  
 
In reality, models of governance based on persuasive technologies already exist. Consider the 
problem of managing traffic: limiting driving speeds can be achieved by a system of laws and 
fines, or by offering some rewards. For example, Enschede (Netherland) has invested 36 
million euros to deploy an app that creates personal mobility profiles and rewards good 
behaviour like cycling or walking (Naafs, 2018).  Similarly, a form of (negative) incentive is 
the supplementary taxes which are added to the cost of unhealthy products (e.g. cigarettes or 
food and drinks with high level of fat) to discourage buyers and promote a healthier lifestyle.   
 
In practice, however, the target-quantities observed by these regulatory systems may be 
replaced by proxies (or surrogates) that only partly align with the actual targets. For example, 
college and university rankings originated from the idea of publishing relevant indicators of 
the performance of higher education institutions, making them more accountable to the public 
(Espeland and Sauder, 2007). But, over the years, they turned into (objective) measures of 
prestige and a goal to be pursued for its own sake. The combination of multiple metrics, such 
as percentage of graduate students and the number of highly cited researchers, is in fact a 
construct that gives a limited understanding of what a university offers and, by the way, the 
result of a computation performed by a social machine. 
 
In sociology this effect relates to the problem of “commensuration” (Espeland and Sauder, 
2007), i.e. the practice of translating qualities into quantities. In particular, Espeland and Sauder 
(2007) pointed out that mechanisms of commensuration tend to change the focus of attention 
and sense making, i.e. “they reduce, simplify and integrate information” (Espeland and Sauder, 
2007, 20)23. This mechanism has many important effects and a problematic one is the 
generation of unexpected and unintended reactions, which are often extraneous to the stated 
goal of the system – e.g. universities started hiring “ranking managers” and manipulating 
internal rules in order to increase their score (Espeland and Sauder, 2007).  
                                                             
23 For example, rankings “are meant to simplify complicated information; they embody decisions that 
make vast amounts of other information, often qualitative knowledge that is hard to assimilate to this 
form, irrelevant” (Espeland and Sauder, 2007: 17). 
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However, whatever the effect, in a control system it is pointless to distinguish between its 
intended and unintended consequences since, from a cybernetic point of view, “the purpose of 
a system is what it does” (Beer, 2002). Therefore, to understand the functioning of a control 
system it is better to look at the observed effect rather than at the original intentions of the 
designer. If the system of credit scoring was initially designed to streamline bank decisions, 
but ended up changing consumer behaviour, then the credit score system has the effect (and 
therefore the purpose) of regulating consumer behaviour. In other words, the purpose of the 
system and that of its designer do not align. Likewise, even though university ranking systems 
were motivated by the need to increase accountability and support decisions of policy makers 
(e.g. how to distribute resources), the ranked institutions adapted their behaviour to the 
incentives (delivered by the score) and generated a number of second-order effects, which 
redefined the goal of the overall system (e.g. to promote standards of prestige and authority).  
 
4.2 – ASMs for Social Control  
If we take O’Reilly’s proposal seriously, the key idea behind algorithmic regulation can take 
the form of an ASM with mechanisms of scoring for citizens and the resulting control loop. 
This would turn a society into a system where citizens are all automatically “enrolled” (not by 
opting into a private service, but as an essential part of their citizenship). The incentives that 
the system generates in terms of score would directly affect citizens’ utility and opportunities, 
and their behaviour would adapt accordingly. The central question posed in this article relates 
to the possible social implications of such a turn. 
 
This mechanism can be used in various ways and at different scales combining public and 
private resources, as O’Reilly suggests. For example, the city of San Francisco partnered with 
Yelp’s restaurant review platform to share health inspection data and “create a safer, healthier 
dining experience”24. But, probably, the most ambitious project has been taken in China, with 
the creation of a Social Credit System. This is intended as an example, as other countries are 
active in the same space, with different projects. 
 
                                                             
24 Each year the health department inspects local restaurant and assign a score based on how they respect 
health code regulation. In this way, the initiative aims at improving food safety and restaurant’s 
attractiveness. See more here: https://www.codeforamerica.org/featured-stories/san-francisco-
promotes-its-restaurant-inspection-data-on-yelp-to-improve-food-safety   
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China has been the first country to officially call for a unified system for social credit, where 
every single citizen is listed in a national database, and “social credit” information is appended 
to it. Different variants of that concept have been tried, and we have to distinguish the national-
level system from various city-level experiments: the current proposals for the national system 
do not include a score, but rather the binary decision of adding a citizen to a black list or a red 
list on the basis of their behaviour, while certain city-level experiments (e.g. projects in Suining 
and Rongcheng), have explored the possibility of using actual scores and letter-grades, as have 
done some private companies (Larson, 2018; Creemers, 2018).   
 
The system resulted from an official policy decision of the Chinese leadership to use 
technology-driven tools for social control, as a supplement to traditional forms of governance 
(Creemers, 2018). The idea originated in the context of financial credit – as a sort of Chinese 
version of FICO score – and expanded across domains to promote trust and honest conduct 
within society25. The plan, officially outlined in 2014, includes a timetable for the realisation 
of a Social Credit System by 2020, including five steps: “creating a legal and regulatory 
framework for the SCS, building credit investigation and oversight, fostering a flourishing 
market built on credit services, and completing incentive and punishment mechanisms.” 
(Creemers, 2018, 12). 
 
While the planning document does not refer to any scoring methods, in the county of Suining 
a local project put the idea in practice. Citizens were given 1000 credit points at the start, then 
points could be deducted for infringements of certain norms, e.g. drunk driving convictions (50 
points), having a child without family planning permission (35 points), non-repayment of loans 
(30 to 50 points). Lost points could be recovered after a period of two to five years. On the 
basis of this score, citizens would be assigned to classes from A to D, and A-class citizens 
would have preferential access to employment opportunities, while lower-ranked citizens 
would face increased scrutiny in several areas, such as Party membership, enlistment in the 
military, loans, governmental support including basic social welfare (Creemers, 2018). The 
experiment, however, attracted criticism from State media, after which the A-D classification 
was dropped. A similar initiative, involving the assignment of a score and a ranking system 
                                                             
25 See the document: State Council. Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System 
(2014-2020). 14 June 2014. Available online: 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-for-theconstruction-of-a-
social-credit-system-2014-2020/  
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with related punishments and rewards (Mistreanu, 2018), has been reported in Rongcheng and 
was listed among the main success stories for the propagation of social credit system26. 
 
At present the Joint Punishment System is the main component which has been developed at 
the nationwide level. The system identifies a series of undesired behaviours (the so-called 
“trust-breaking acts”), which contribute to the creation of a blacklist, and associated 
punishments. Examples of untrustworthy acts include: endangering the personal health and life 
security of the popular masses, tax evasion, malicious evasion of debt, sales of fake and shoddy 
products, false advertising, gathering a mob to bring social order into chaos, refusing to carry 
out statutory duties, or gravely influencing the credibility of judicial bodies and administrative 
bodies, refusing to carry out national defence duties, refusing or evading military service, etc.27  
 
Once a citizen is flagged with the “blacklist status”, they can face restrictions in disparate fields: 
e.g. “They were barred from senior position in SOEs, financial sectors […] They were no 
longer allowed to travel first class, on high-speed trains, or on civil aircraft, to visit star-rated 
hotels or luxury restaurants, resorts, nightclubs and golf courses, to go on foreign holidays, to 
send their children to fee-paying schools, to purchase particular kinds of high-value insurance 
products, to buy or renovate their homes, or purchase cars.” (Creemers, 2018:15). 
 
As Creemers (2018) suggests, key elements in the design of the SCS are 1) a system that 
ensures a unique, lifelong identifier for each citizen and a register number for corporations; 2) 
a massive data infrastructure to collect information about subjects from different sources (e.g. 
bank, local authorities, social organizations, etc.); and 3) data mining technologies28 to process 
the stored information to sort people and provide pathways for action.  
 
                                                             
26 See the document “Notice concerning Issuing the Name List of the First Batch of Social Credit 
System Construction Demonstration Cities” of the National Development and reform Commission, 
and People’s Bank of China, cited in footnote n. 81 in Creemers (2018)  
27 A more complete list can be found in document released by the State Council on 30th May 2016 (see 
note n. 1) 
28 However, as Creemers (2018) pointed out, at present there are few evidences on the employment of 
algorithmic analysis, apart from credit scoring: “As far as public documents indicate, anyone’s social 
credit status will only be influenced by the history of their own conduct to the extent that it is covered 
through the SCS’s remit. Technological analysis is used, however, to make mass information more 
manageable, accessible or technologically presentable.” (Creemers, 2018, 22) 
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It is important to observe that similar components can be found in other national projects of 
smart governance. For example, Singapore’s project started a wide process of digitalisation 
since the eighties and recently moved to the next steps, integrating Internet of Things (IoT)  
and AI solutions. Its ambition is to provide “anticipatory services”, i.e. to solve issues before 
they are brought to the surface29. The project includes systems for detecting illegal parking, 
managing traffic and delivering services at key events of people’s life30.  
 
In Europe, a model for smart governance is given by Estonia, where there are some analogies 
with the aforementioned cases: a unique identifier for each citizen linked to various repositories 
owned by private or public institutions (governments’ departments, hospitals, pharmacies, 
schools, etc.), and tools for providing citizens and organisations with a vast array of services, 
from filing taxes, parking, buying tickets, to policing and voting (e-Governance Academy 
Foundation, 2016).  
 
A distinctive feature of Estonia’s project is that all data are not stored centrally, and a data 
exchange platform, X-Road, ensures secure communication among the various repositories. 
This reflects Estonia’s most inherent philosophy about data: information should not be entered 
twice – Estonia’s Public Information Act does not allow organisations to establish separate 
databases to collect the same data (Vassil, 2016) –, and individuals should be the owners of 
their data (e-Governance Academy Foundation, 2016; Heller, 2017). However, although the 
eGovernment ecosystem incorporates explicit legal principles for the protection of personal 
data, to the best of our knowledge, citizens’ right to authorize or deny access to personal data 
is limited to the health-care system (Priisalu and Ottis, 2017) – e.g. does this apply also to 
education and business services? – and the possibility to opt-out of the ID card system is not 
allowed31.   
 
                                                             
29 https://www.zdnet.com/article/singapore-unveils-plan-in-push-to-become-smart-nation/ but also see 
the report “Digital Government Blueprint” https://www.tech.gov.sg/-
/media/GovTech/DigitalTransformation/Digital-Government-
Blueprint/dgb_booklet_june2018.pdf?la=en  
30 For example, in 2018 a new app was launched for starting families. Thus, new parents could be 
automatically informed about birth registration, infant care and kindergarten admissions (see: 
https://govinsider.asia/digital-gov/singapore-smart-nation-e-payments-national-digital-identity-
anticipatory-services/) 
31 The ID card, which gives access to the services, are obligatory for all citizens, a rule that was 
approved in 2000 by the Estonian Parliament with the Identity Document Act (Vassil, 2016). 
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The article (Priisalu and Ottis, p. 445) implies that personal data is accessible to government 
officers, the only protection being an automatic audit trail that makes it possible to log any 
access to personal data.  
 
At present Estonia government does not include any scoring or reputation mechanisms, but in 
future the system may evolve into a next generation of e-services as a result of the persistent 
data collection activities. For example, the use of predictive analytics has been advocated 32 in 
the context of disease prediction (e.g. type 2 diabetes).  
 
Even though ASMs for nationwide social control do not exist in Europe, some argue that the 
seeds of a social scoring are already present in European countries. For example, the 
psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer observed that in Germany there is a credit score, called “Schufa”, 
that assesses three-quarter of Germans and five million companies. He observed that people 
who aim to rent a house or get a loan in Germany are required to provide their “Schufa rating” 
(the analogous of FICO score in US) and “factors like “geo-scoring” can also lower your 
overall grade if you happen to live in a low-rent neighborhood, or even if a lot of your neighbors 
have bad credit ratings.” (quoted in Jahberg, 2018).  
 
4.3 - Examples from the Private Sector 
 
Despite the recommendations of Tim O’Reilly, the governance systems currently being 
developed by states do not match those used in the private sector, but it is worth keeping an 
eye on that sector, to see what side-effects this management technology can have. 
 
As we said an important area of application for algorithmic governance is credit scoring. The 
capability of regulating people’s behaviour is a direct consequence of the huge impact that a 
credit score has on people’s life: a bad credit score can result in higher interest rates for a loan 
or, even worse, a denial of loan application. But the information determining a credit score (i.e. 
the credit report) may in part affect other important decisions, such as hiring and renting – 
                                                             
32 See the interview to Kristjan Vassil (University of Tartu) on the next generation of e-services, 
available online: https://e-estonia.com/a-conversation-with-kristjan-vassil-on-the-next-generation-of-
public-e-services/ and the claims of the Chief Information Officer Siim Sikkut quoted here: 
https://www.politico.eu/article/test-driving-the-ultimate-connected-society-e-stonia/  
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credit checks can in fact be requested also by employers, landlords and utility companies33. Of 
course, these effects translate into actions to be taken by the individual in order to avoid bad 
behaviours (e.g. delays in payments and losing income) that would negatively impact the score 
and create a bad credit reputation. 
 
In future we may expect that the influence of credit score will expand beyond its original 
boundaries – for example some suggest application in online dating 34 - and a sign of this might 
be the growing numbers of tech companies issuing credit scores. For example, firms like 
Sesame credit (an affiliate of Alibaba), Tencent, and Lenddo issue credit scores also by making 
use of online shopping habits, social media and networking activities. Some argued that this 
phenomenon might have disruptive effects on how credit scoring regulates social behaviour 
(Gapper, 2018). So, while in traditional credit systems one improves its score by borrowing 
less and displaying self-control, social credit “tends to work in the opposite way — it gives 
users an incentive to buy and rent items through platforms, and to build a circle of active and 
highly rated friends.” (Gapper, 2018) 
 
A key example of algorithmic regulation in the private sector is Uber, a digital platform that 
coordinates nearly two million drivers35 by means of an autonomous software agent. Rosenblatt 
(2018) summarises the situation of Uber drivers as working for an algorithm and says that: “the 
algorithmic manager seems to watch everything you do. Ride-hailing platforms track a variety 
of personalized statistics36, including ride acceptance rates, cancellation rates, hours spent 
logged into the app and trips completed”. She also adds that: “Uber uses the accelerometer in 
driver’ phones along with GPS and gyroscope to give them safe-driving reports, tracking their 
performance in granular detail.”  Rosenblatt (2018). 
                                                             
33 For example, Experian, one of the main credit reporting agencies, declares that a job candidate may 
not be hired because of a bad credit report: and 
https://www.experian.co.uk/consumer/guides/employment.html The same may also happen for 
ranting as reported by Equifax (another popular credit rating agency): 
https://www.equifax.co.uk/resources/loans_and_credit/credit_checks_for_renting.html  
34 For example, Denyer (2016) claimed there are some online dating platforms which encourage users 
to “display their Sesame Credit scores to attract potential partners.” 
35 If we consider other Uber services, such as Uber eat, riders are 75 million. See some facts and 
figures in Uber website: https://www.uber.com/en-GB/newsroom/company-info/  
36 The assessment of drivers combines a star rating system, cancellation rate, acceptance rate and 
safety (e.g. through GPS tracking). Each of these can contribute to quality assessment, for example: 
“Cancellations create a poor rider experience and negatively affect other drivers”. See more on Uber 
Community Guidelines: https://www.uber.com/legal/community-guidelines/us-en/  
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Notifications on performance and incentives are delivered on a regular basis to each driver. For 
example, Rosenblatt (2018) reports that drivers are shown selected statistics as motivating tools 
(e.g. “you are in the top 10% of partners”) and are informed on the areas in high demand. 
 
The rating systems can also contribute to the deactivation of drivers: “In certain services on 
Uber’s platform, if drivers fall below 4.6 stars on a 5-star rating system, they may be 
“deactivated” — never fired. So, some drivers tolerate bad passenger behaviour rather than 
risking retaliatory reviews” (Rosenblatt, 2018).   
 
In 2015 an article in Forbes already described this situation based on a blog post37 of Silicon 
Valley CEO Peter Reinhardt. The article stresses that the main effect of labour platforms 
following a Uber-like model is that of “replacing middle management with APIs” (Kosner, 
2015). This is described as a trend that will divide jobs into two categories, those below the 
API, managed by a software platform, and those above the API, in charge of making or 
controlling such platform (Kosner, 2015). 
The use of metrics and algorithms to manage a working environment has also been used in 
Amazon warehouses, as reported by New York Times in 2015 (Kantor and Streitfeld, 2015). 
This article describes warehouses where workers are monitored by electronic systems to track 
performance, and office workers can report on each other’s performance through a tool called 
“Anytime Feedback”, which provides part of the metrics that rank workers – according to 
Kantor and Streitfeld (2015) the bottom of the ranking is eliminated periodically.  
 
5 – Discussion  
 
The governance of increasingly large organisations or entire societies has so far relied on a set 
of methods and principles that evolved over the centuries, such as representative democracy 
and law enforcement. As we see various proposals for the introduction of new technologies for 
social regulation, we should be clear that this turn would involve a transfer of power from 
current institutions to new ones, and that this transfer might not easily be reversible. Therefore, 
                                                             
37 The blog post entitled “replacing middle management with an API” is available online: 
https://rein.pk/replacing-middle-management-with-apis 
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a careful examination of positive and negative consequences would be essential, as well as a 
transparent public debate including all parts involved, before - not after - any deployment.  
 
The stated benefits of various forms of digital governance, with or without predictive analytics 
or incentive systems, have been mentioned above: increased transparency and efficiency (from 
the Estonian project), increased compliance and morality (from the Chinese projects), faster 
adaptation and control (from various commercial projects). Moreover, algorithmic regulation 
may offer greater flexibility and reduce the workload of regulators with saving of costs and 
time, i.e. it would allow to “govern least” (O’Reilly, 2013) 
 
In the subsections below, we focus on possible consequences of adopting algorithmic 
regulation of society, and at the end we also describe one possible way in which this might 
emerge without being explicitly adopted. Questions of various orders should be addressed as a 
matter of urgency, by different sectors of society and academia. These might regard issues of 
stability (How do we deal with undesirable dynamics, such as wealth concentration and low 
social mobility?), personal autonomy (how can we prevent an ASM from bypassing human 
deliberation?), value judgments (to what extent could an ASM elicit change of habits?), and 
power (could an ASM redefine social ties and social norms?).  
While we mention some of them below, we do not claim that we can cover all of them: this 
new area of technological and social change does require urgent multidisciplinary attention. 
The purpose of this article is to pose the question of what implications this technology might 
have for society, multiple voices will be needed to address it.  
 
The concerns of possible problematic consequences can be divided into three levels: technical, 
ethical and political. By this we mean to separate risks that would result from an imperfect 
technical realisation of the project, from those that would result from the concept itself of 
algorithmic control of society.  
 
5.1 Technical level 
While the engineering aspects of building an ASM can be solved by using infrastructures and 
technologies of the sort used today by online companies (e.g. Facebook) or banks, the emerging 
effects of connecting multiple interacting parts are not explored. Once everything is connected 
with everything, higher order interactions can emerge. If the opportunity to have a job relates 
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to online purchases or reading habits, for example, a new unexplored interaction is created. So, 
creating multiple separate feedback loops and scores might be safer and more stable than 
merging them and combining them into a general national scoring system. The experience of 
filter bubbles, public-opinion manipulations, market flash crashes, should be kept very much 
in mind.  
 
As the individual scores both affect the behaviour of citizens and are affected by it, there is the 
potential for feedback loops. If we also introduce reputation into the equation, then feedback 
loops can lead to stigmatisation and discrimination (positive feedback loops amplify small 
differences). If we use social connections of a citizen as one of the signals to compute their 
social credit, we might automatically create the potential for stigmatisation of low-rank people, 
which would create a dynamic of rich-gets-richer and poor-gets-poorer, or self-fulfilling 
prophecies: if people believe that they will be penalised by associating with low-scoring 
people, then they will adapt their behaviour – thereby reducing the opportunities of low-scoring 
people.  
 
One should not exclude that similar dynamics might end up generating a power-law 
distribution, like those observed in the disproportionate distribution of wealth (Jha, 2011). In a 
social scoring system a similar distribution would create an elite of people clustering around 
the first positions and the vast majority variously distributed on the rest, so that only a small 
portion of the population would account for the average score of a country’s citizens.  
 
Social mobility would be a connected issue, if negative feedback blocks people into the same 
rank with little chances of moving. The opposite can also be problematic, with excessive 
volatility, due to positive feedback loops. Either way, the design of these systems might directly 
affect society structure and should not be taken lightly.  
 
Instabilities might potentially also lead to flash-crashes, or inflation, as well as spontaneous 
growth in inequality. Just like filter bubbles and market flash-crashes, feedback effects should 
be expected here, and remedies should be planned ahead. What kind of dynamics can we 
expect? What lessons might be learnt from analogous complex interactions (e.g. algorithmic 
pricing) and applied to an ASM? What are the risks of instability? 
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The purpose of an autonomous system is defined by its value function, and the control system 
centred around the social score is no exception: it will incentivise specific behaviours in the 
user and in society as a whole. The problem is that we typically can only measure the state of 
the controlled system (society) through proxies, that we assume to be well aligned with our 
actual goals. The quality of that approximation may change with time, as the controlled system 
evolves, and over time we might have a system that is actively encouraging the pursuit of 
behaviours that do not align with the original goals. Citizens may have to follow behaviours 
that are actually sub-optimal or negative, in order not to be disadvantaged. 
 
Furthermore, if the value function is itself relative to the rest of society (e.g. bonus is given to 
the top-10% in the group, or for moving towards the mean-behaviour in the community, etc.) 
then this can create not only competition, but also a drifting value function. Rational citizens 
might then work against their own long-term good, locked into this behaviour by the automated 
system of incentives. In academia – to cite a familiar example to our readers – this has led many 
to prioritise publication numbers over quality, and ultimately to a multiplication of academic 
journals only justified by the spurious identification of publication rates with scientific 
productivity. In a similar scenario who will be in charge of changing the overall value 
function? what kind of safeguard measures do we need to avoid undesired drift, or worst, 
detrimental effects?  
 
5.2 Cultural and ethical level 
 
The idea of using feedback loops for the control of social systems is as old as cybernetics. 
Stafford Beer pioneered the use of cybernetics in management, introducing the notion of “total 
system” (Beer, 1975), and the founder himself of the field, Norbert Wiener, devoted a book to 
the topic (Wiener, 1950). In legal scholarship, a similar view underlies the analysis of decentred 
regulation whose essential elements include, among other things, complexity, fragmentation of 
knowledge and the exercise of power, and interdependencies (Black, 2002). Still, with his 
popular motto “the code is the law”, Lawrence Lessing suggested how the architecture of the 
Net (and its possible evolutions) can become a perfect tool of social control (Lessing, 2006)38. 
                                                             
38 “the invisible hand of cyberspace is building an architecture that is quite the opposite of its 
architecture at its birth. This invisible hand, pushed by government and by commerce, is constructing 
an architecture that will perfect control and make highly efficient regulation possible” (Lessing, 2006: 
19) 
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So, what is proposed by O’Reilly, and is being explored in China and other countries, is not an 
innovation per se – the novelty is that we now have the technical means to gather individual 
information and administer individual incentives on a vast scale.  
 
This article suggests that any such system requires the creation of a powerful intermediator: 
the infrastructure that gathers and manages individual information, computes scores and 
incentives, and organises the individual scores. Whoever sets the rules for that calculation has 
the power to steer the social group represented in the database. This observation, which is 
inherent to the design of an autonomous agent, suggests a possible cultural fallacy in the ideal 
of a decentred exercise of power. Fragmentation of knowledge and distributed information 
processing might give the participants only the illusion of freedom since their choices would 
be continuously coordinated and influenced by the controlling agent (i.e. the system-level 
utility function).  
 
Even though the idea of self-regulation is fascinating because of its capability of harnessing 
diffused power and knowledge within society, the regulation operated by an ASM would be 
anything but neutral39. The introduction of intelligent machines at the centre of our society 
creates an intermediator with enormous privilege: it would behave as the best-informed player 
at each level of social interactions and the coordinator of all partial decisions (Wiener, 1950).   
 
The transition towards a non-neutral ASM regulating a group of people (be that an online 
community or a nation) creates a number of interrelated issues concerning human autonomy 
and freedom. These issues may arise from bypassing participants in making decisions and 
taking various assumptions for granted in the design process. For example, the idea of moving 
the regulation of domestic work into a platform like Handy or TaskRabbit, supposes that every 
participant agrees on various points (i.e. the rules of the game): e.g. that everyone has a device 
to access the service and knows how to use it; that customers’ ratings determine the salary of 
the taskers; that members communicate only by using the platform, and so forth.  
 
                                                             
39 As Gillespie observed, the ability to orchestrate interaction among users is often contrasted by 
claims of impartiality made by the owners of media platforms: “from their earliest presentation they 
have often characterized themselves as open to all comers; in their promotion they often suggest that 
they merely facilitate public expression, that they are impartial and hands-off hosts, with an 
“information will be free” ethos, and that being so is central to their mission” (Gillespie, 2017 p. 4) 
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In some cases, the implicit acceptance of the rules of the game as a precondition to opt-in might 
be not problematic (e.g. eBay or Airbnb) but in others decisions should be negotiated with all 
members of the community. This is the case of services involving citizens and the possibility 
to coerce them by imposing conditions they might not share or agree with. For example, the 
decision of using a digital infrastructure to regulate the activity of a school would require a 
process of reflection and discussion at different levels (individual, family, the board of teachers, 
etc.) to enable everyone to express their own opinions and participate in the deliberative 
process. In fact, a choice of that kind would not be just a technical change but also a policy 
decision premised on various assumptions (e.g. do all families have access to digital devices? 
do all agree on the educational values supporting certain functionalities?). One of the problems 
posed by an ASM regulating society is that it tends to obfuscate what decisions its participants 
are entitled to and what could be made without their involvement (i.e. without any infringement 
of citizens’ rights). So, fundamental questions for policy-makers, designers and scholars, are: 
what decisions and assumptions does the system take for granted? how may these impact the 
life of people? what decisions should be debated by all members of the community? And, more 
in general, in which ways could an ASM change democratic participation and social inclusion? 
Answering these questions involves a perspective of cooperative responsibility as an ASM 
results from the dynamic interaction of different types of actors (the participants, the owners 
of the platforms, etc.) and requires developing a process of public deliberation (Helberger et 
al., 2018) 
 
An immediate dilemma emerging from this practice would be: should the scores be public? 
should they be shared with the individuals? Should the various metrics and formulae be public? 
Each answer would lead to different problems: complete transparency would create the risk of 
people ‘gaming’ the system, less than that would reduce people’s chances to calculate their 
best course of action.  
 
Another set of problematic issues regards the internalisation of the quantities which may 
qualify participants in a social machine (e.g. their reputation or their performance). When we 
introduce a new intermediator to manage social regulation, we may internalise and socialise 
quantities such as our social score, effectively self-regulating us according to the rules of the 
system.  
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The application of numbers to qualify people’s life not only marks a departure from modern 
conceptions of human dignity40, but also promotes a new form of moral exemplarity. The 
computation of scores has in fact the function of producing appropriate incentives and, with 
them, a desired change of (external) behaviour. But, as well as that, it may also involve a change 
of participants’ cognition (Espeland and Sauder, 2007), i.e. how do they interpret and value 
those numbers. As participants assimilate connections between scores and benefits/penalties, 
they may internalise authoritative standards against which assess themselves and others. For 
example, connecting a credit score to the ability of finding a partner invites people to value 
creditworthiness as a proxy of attractiveness, and making public high-rated users (e.g. eBay) 
or high-scored citizens (e.g. China) are effective ways to create role models and inspiring 
examples.  Can we imagine a new class system based on these scores? How powerful would 
be whoever can affect that class system?  
We should also note here that recent work (Burr and Cristianini, 2019) suggests that very 
personal information, such as beliefs, attitudes and aptitudes, can be inferred from the analysis 
of online behaviour, which poses new issues related to freedom of expression, as well as to 
privacy and fairness.  
 
As an ASM expands its ability to implicitly convey values and norms, one might ask what the 
role of free will in participants’ reaction is, and to what extent their change of beliefs and values 
is in fact due to persuasive mechanisms (see also Burr et al, 2018) rather than intentional 
actions. The development of moral habits requires some degree of automatism - it is a common 
idea in both ancient and contemporary philosophers that habits requires repetition and routine 
movements (e.g. see Aristotle and William James) - but this is not just a passive exercise. The 
acquisition of habits needs also the faculty of judgment deliberating what are good and bad 
habits (see e.g. the role of practical rationality/wisdom in Aristotle or Dewey’s value 
judgments). To what extent could an ASM elicit change of habits? How can participants 
exercise moral judgment in a social machine which tries to continually adjust their behaviour 
and has the potential to change their beliefs and values? How do we help participants purse 
their goals in the respect of their freedom, autonomy and dignity? 
 
5.3 Political and social level 
                                                             
40 In Western culture moral principles and human rights rest on Kantian conception of human dignity 
considered as “an intrinsic worth” that is distinguished from something that has a price and that can be 
exchanged for something else (Kant, 1785).  
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Attention should also be paid to the political and social implications of this technology. One 
political concern that has been put forward, is that the emergence of a form of governance is 
strongly related to technological innovation, and intelligent systems may contribute to the 
creation of new authoritarian regimes (Harari, 2018). In this scenario, the new face of 
dictatorship might not necessary be that of an unpleasant, authoritarian ruler, but that of an 
efficient autonomous system which exploits the information produced by citizens with the aim 
of prescribing the behaviours that best maximise its specific goal (be that “trust”, “honesty”, 
“excellence”, “transparency”, “accountability”, etc). Using the terminology of this article we 
could consider that the next generation of dictators might look like an ASM, i.e. an autonomous 
social machine that mediates every interaction and, thanks to the collected information, 
computes scores and delivers incentives to influence participants’ behaviour. 
 
While the example of the Chinese system is not an ASM - as we said, the apparatus rests on a 
binary decision (not a score) and incentives are not generated automatically by an algorithm -, 
the system proposed by O’Reilly would definitely be. The technical properties we surveyed in 
the previous sections, now invite us to reflect on their social impact. 
 
As the deployment of social-regulation technologies is essentially an exercise in reforming the 
way we control society, it is at its core a problem of power. This should be analysed with the 
conceptual tools relative to power and institutions, which is too large a topic to be discussed 
here. However, we will discuss here a few basic considerations with respect to contemporary 
conceptualizations of power. 
 
In social and political science, the notion of power refers to a form of control that is exercised 
on a group of people by some authority (e.g. a government, a monarch, a religious leader, a 
manager, etc.). Its exercise may involve the use of physical force, but modern societies have 
also developed non-violent methods to control populations. These include a set of mechanisms 
based on scientific knowledge and technical innovations to manage effectively social 
organisations (e.g. cities, hospitals, schools, prisons, factories, etc.), an approach that Michel 
Foucault calls “biopower” (Foucault, 2007). According to Foucault modern institutions, 
starting from the military system, have learnt such methods and developed common 
characteristics that we might find also in a social machine: hierarchical surveillance - spaces 
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and hierarchies are designed in a way to make “people docile and knowable” (Foucault, 1991, 
172) - , mechanisms of gratification and punishment which correct and differentiate individuals 
(the so-called “normalizing judgments”41), and perpetual forms of examination which define 
the particular status of each individual.42  
 
It would be interesting to analyse how ASMs fit within the general progression of methods of 
social control described by Foucault, and we leave this as an important open question 
(Foucault, 1991). 
 
More generally, future work should attempt to answer the following questions; what kind of 
society could an ASM produce? what social norms would it reflect? Who would be responsible 
for their embedding into the system? How do we guarantee the pluralism of values in a system 
that might tend to homogenize individuals?  
 
In political philosophy, the framing of social bonds in purely utilitarian terms would connect 
to the notion of “private society”, i.e. a group of individuals whose “motivational horizons do 
not extend beyond the people and projects that are the focus of their personal lives” (Waheed, 
2018). A society of this type tends to undermine the idea of common good43 because each 
individual would care about only those goods with a direct impact on its private life. Even in a 
context of an ASM, where incentives might be deployed for promoting a specific common 
good, say equal access to opportunities, some philosophers would argue that this would not be 
                                                             
41 “The art of punishing, in the regime of disciplinary power, is aimed neither at expiation, nor even 
precisely at repression. It brings five quite distinct operations into play: it refers individual actions to a 
whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation and the principle of a rule to be 
followed. It differentiates individuals from one another, in terms of the following overall rule: that the 
rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected or as an optimum 
towards which one must move. ft measures in quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms of value the 
abilities, the level, the 'nature' of individuals. It introduces, through this 'value-giving' measure, the 
constraint of a conformity that must be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that will define difference 
in relation to all other differences, the external frontier of the abnormal” (Foucault, 1991,182) 
42 Foucault took Bentham’s panopticon as the best representation of a complex of mechanisms 
governing a social body: “a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining power relations in 
terms of the everyday life of men” (Foucault, 1991, 205) 
43 The notion of common good is controversial and different accounts exists. In this article we refer to 
the common good as the set of interests that all members of a community care about in virtue of their 
mutual relationships, such as civil liberties and public safety (Waheed, 2018). 
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enough: even in that case individuals would act for the sake of some private benefit and fail to 
perceive a “relational obligation towards common affairs”44 (Waheed, 2018) 
These intuitions suggest that a society implementing algorithmic regulation may risk to 
redefine social relations: individuals might be encouraged to establish strategic relationships 
(seek people that would increase social score and avoid those that would penalize it) according 
to the incentives set up by the controlling agent. What would be the future of the common good 
in a society regulated by an ASM? How could an ASM contribute to protect common interests 
which would stand independently of individual agents’ interest (be that of the controlled or the 
controlling agent) and, potentially, in contrast to anyone of them?  
 
Conclusions 
 
The main purpose of this article is to pose a series of urgent questions, rather than answering 
them. Algorithmic regulation in this moment is little more than a tempting idea in academic, 
policy and entrepreneurial circles, but many of its components already exist, and furthermore 
many recent developments suggest that there is political interest in some version of it, although 
by other names. While it might be unlikely that in Europe, we would see an explicit effort to 
fully deploy this kind of system, there is still the risk that this might emerge on its own, as the 
result of mergers and drifts of related systems, much like it seems to be happening with national 
DNA or ID systems or surveillance  
 
The risk of drifting into some version of algorithmic regulation is real. For example, it may 
start from a specific or local project, then grow by increasingly incorporating new capabilities 
(e.g. linkage of information, inference mechanism, classification systems, etc). Maybe they 
could start as an opt-in system, but then by gravitational-pull end up being unavoidable, and 
de facto mandatory, as is today being online. The most likely starting points for this drift are 
either a national ID system, acting as the scaffold to connect various sources of personal 
information, or a scoring system for specific categories (e.g. for certain professions) with the 
ability of growing to cover an increasingly large domain of society.  
 
                                                             
44 These relational obligations are analogous to those found in family: parents are required not only to 
feed and clothe their children, they are also required to care about them (Waheed, 2018), e.g. their 
education, their mental and physical health, their moral development, etc. Something analogous exists 
also for civic relations. 
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Any social platform where users interact will end up influencing their behaviour, and not in a 
neutral way. An instructive example of unintended drift – that would be familiar to the readers 
of this article – is that of ORCID numbers, initially introduced as a way to solve homonymy 
among researchers, which however nudge all members to accept various levels of service, 
linking their name to citation indices, and essentially nudging towards a scoring system for 
academics. Since many journals demand that their authors have an ORCID number, there is a 
clear path a hypothetical moment where all researchers would have to accept the scoring system 
chosen and therefore act accordingly. Of course, there is nothing particularly sinister in 
academic scoring, this example is only intended to illustrate how drift can happen. 
 
This simple consideration adds one more question to the list of problems that we encourage 
our colleagues to work on: that relative to the opting-out / opting-in dilemma, which keeps on 
emerging in different areas of digital ethics.  
 
We call “gravitational pull” the problem posed by technologies (e.g. algorithmic regulation) 
when they exert a force that brings ever larger portions of people’s life into them. As the system 
scales up, the cost of opting-out increases with the size (or coverage) of such a system. Not 
only is this used in viral marketing strategies, but this also creates a Nash equilibrium where 
everyone is part of the system: at that point there is significant cost for each individual to leave. 
Could a business today afford not being on the internet? Is it still meaningful to claim that 
people have freely opted into such a system? 
 
In the case of social scoring, imagine the situation where if a private entity takes the role of 
endorsing people, and gathers significant following, such that citizens are at a disadvantage by 
not opting-in, what obligations does that business have? Are these the obligations that currently 
apply to (financial) credit scoring systems? Would that private actor have the right to demote 
or expel (i.e., excommunicate) an individual? Of course, these issues become even more 
pressing if the endorsement is operated by a public institution.  
 
As we said, the problem of “gravitational pull” relates to that of “opting-out”: what do you do 
when most other members of your community agree to be scored, to quantify their level of 
trustworthiness? If you join, you accept the scoring rules and their consequences, as well as 
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giving increased coverage to the system. If you do not join, you might be stigmatised, 
potentially losing access to opportunities.  
 
This is just an example of the several dilemmas that emerge from the study of persuasive 
technologies and algorithmic regulation, and they all - eventually - merge at the same place: 
the need to give a new, fresh and multidisciplinary look at the issue of autonomy and social 
ties, in the new situation where technology brings new challenges to that fragile concept. We 
hope that scholars in Ethics, Sociology and Engineering will find a way to jointly address that 
question.  
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